Regarding the transition to a new era in Syria, Önhon said, “This is not an issue that only two capitals can solve,” adding that the involvement of the international community is absolutely necessary.
Ömer Önhon started his career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985 as a candidate professional officer in the Middle East Department. In those years, the PKK carried out an action by crossing from Syria to Turkey for the first time. On 28 August 1998, he was appointed as the Undersecretary of the Embassy to Damascus. During this duty, he witnessed the signing of the Adana Agreement between Turkey and Syria, the exit of Abdullah Öcalan from Syria, and the arrival of his son, Bashar Assad, in place of Hafız Assad. In September 2009, he went to Syria, this time as Turkey’s Ambassador to Damascus. Önhon, who knows the beginning and development of the events in the country best, had to evacuate the Turkish Embassy and leave Syria on 25 March 2012, before the end of his term of office. We talked with Önhon, who is also the author of the book “Syria Through the Eyes of the Ambassador”, whether it is possible to start a new era in Syria-Turkey relations after 11 years, and the conditions…
Do you think the immigration/refugee issue is the most driving force in moving towards a new era in Turkey-Syria relations?
There are two main issues originating from Syria. One is the issue of security and the other is the issue of asylum seekers. In security; We detect a threat originating from the YPG from there. Something beyond perception. Terrorist acts were committed from Syrian territory to our lands. We see that the YPG is striving for ‘a kind of statehood’ right on the other side of our borders. They currently control 30-35 percent of Syria. Not only in terms of land, but also in terms of population, 6-7 million people live in the lands under their control. Nearly 95 percent of Syrian oil is in YPG-controlled areas. The regions of the country that are called granaries are still here. You are looking at the dams, they are here again. In other words, YPG holds a region that includes a very important part of the country’s wealth. 911 km. If I’m not mistaken, the YPG is in front of us on the 400-kilometer line of the border. All these constitute the security dimension of the event.
In terms of refugees, according to official figures, 3.5 million Syrians live in our country. Until a while ago, it was said that they would return when conditions in their country improved. But in real life, it was clear that this would not be the case. Nearly 500 thousand Syrian children were born in Turkey. These children know Turkey as a country. Many of them speak Turkish. A person who came to this country at the age of 10 in 2011 is 21 years old today. He’s going to school, he’s going to start a business, so he built his life here. When you look at the research done by Syrian organizations, Syrians say; ‘yes we will return but we will not return to a Syria under this regime or we will return but far ahead’.
These two issues touch the veins and nerve endings of Turkey. For example, improving relations with Egypt is a very important thing, indeed. It has many dimensions such as the recovery between the two most prominent countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, the re-establishment of the closeness from the historical union, and economic and commercial interests. But Egypt is never an issue that can penetrate Turkey’s domestic politics. Egypt is more of a foreign policy issue. Syria is not like that. The issue of security and asylum seekers originating from Syria are issues that directly touch Turkey’s nerve endings and that can win or lose votes in the elections.
The President said ‘Diplomacy cannot be completely disabled’…
In English, it’s called ‘better late than never’. In any case, we now see that there is a desire on the Turkish side in this regard. The government is going to ease the burden before the elections.
You say, ‘It seems that Turkey has a desire’. Do you think there is a similar desire in the regime in Syria?
The desire in Syria, the desire of Assad, absolutely; the desire to ‘how can I maintain my power’. If an agreement with Turkey will enable him to maintain his power, Assad will do it. When the events started in 2011, especially Turkey insisted on Assad, ‘the people’s wishes are not demands that cannot be fulfilled. Make these reforms. For the government you will form in the elections, take someone from the segments that have no relation to the government. Include them in politics too. You both protect your own place and meet the demands of the opponents. You will be shown as an example as a reformist leader in the region, and you will further strengthen your own position’. Assad always said ‘you are very right, I will do it’, he never did. Why didn’t he? The leaders of the Assad administration sat down, evaluated the situation, and I think they came to the following conclusion: ‘If we share power, it will result in us losing power after a while’ they said. That was the point and mood they were in in 2011. By 2022, we see that they haven’t moved an inch from this point. So, again, power sharing equals power loss. We saw at the Constitutional Committee meetings that they did not go beyond that point. The regime did not attend these meetings to achieve results. The Russians joined because they said ‘join or you will leave us in a difficult situation’. Second; They participated in order not to give the appearance of running away from the table. But has any progress been made in the meetings? No progress has been made.
The Assad administration calls the opposition ‘terrorists’ and says ‘I do not do business with them, they are agents of another country’. It is really difficult to take a step in such an environment. Dozens of people have been killed by the use of chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta, today (the day before) anniversary. Here is an administration that has used chemical weapons against its own people. There are thousands of people who have been in prisons for years without any charges. It is impossible for the dissidents to forget all this.
‘Will Erdogan meet with Assad?’….’Did he say Assad? Did he say Assad?’… These are the magazine dimensions of the business. First you need to create a foundation. Here, of course, intelligence agencies contacted the instructions of their top managers. Now, it is necessary to build on it and discuss what our issues are at the political stage, what we can do. But, of course, this is not a problem that only two capitals can solve. The involvement of the international community will certainly be required. I always say the same thing: First, there are all the references and parameters of a possible solution in the United Nations Security Council resolution 2254. Secondly, all the relevant actors, including Iran, the Syrian regime and Russia, have accepted this.
So if you want, there is a starting point at hand…
There is a basis, of course, for sure. What is missing? It is political will. If that political will can be put forward, if the relevant actors directly say ‘it’s time to find a solution’, if the UN can take it under its own umbrella and manage it, there is a chance… But as I said, not only foreign actors but also Assad’s must show political will. Will Assad go to such a path or not? By the way, among the opposition, of course, there are those who oppose this to the death. Some opponents say, ‘What should we do? But some say, ‘Assad used all kinds of weapons, including chemicals, against us. He is not someone to sit and talk to. A war criminal who must be brought to justice.’ says. So it’s a very difficult process.
There are tens of thousands of armed militia, tens of thousands of all kinds of weapons. What will these be? There are Syrian dissidents, there are radical groups, there are foreign fighters… He came from somewhere, where will this man go? He cannot stay in Syria. His own country does not accept it anyway. Where will he go to? I guess he won’t come to Turkey…
Does haste have a price, too?
Some things need to be done in a balanced and measured way. Hasty steps can do more harm than good. You have to go with a plan. I’m not sure if there is a well thought out plan or not.
‘Different priorities’
The expression ‘normalization’ in Turkey-Syria relations is not used yet. There is talk of reconciling the regime with the opposition. As someone who knows both the Syrian opposition and the regime very well, is it possible for these two parties to reconcile?
When you look at the world, there is generally no unending crisis. Even the most endless crises come to the point of mutual acceptance in some way. A crisis is a very costly thing. The longer it gets, the harder it is to compensate for the damage done. The cost increases further. Therefore, at some point, a solution is reached.
There is a problem in Syria: there are many actors on the field. Russia, the USA, Iran, various Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, of course. The interests of these actors do not always coincide. They are often in conflict with each other. Different agendas, different priorities. For example, Turkey says ‘refugees are our priority’, but for Russia, asylum seekers are of no importance. The difference in priorities is a big deal.
Secondly, there is no such thing as two Syrian groups in opposing camps in Syria to come together and resolve the issue. It will be an effect of external influence. If all these actors can somehow meet on a common ground, at least in common, a solution can be reached.
We have a very difficult period ahead of us, we have to admit it. Even if the leaders of two, three or five countries come together and say, ‘OK, we have decided on the solution’, this is not something that can be done in a day. There are so many sub-topics and sub-issues that it will take a long time to resolve them. But of course you have to start somewhere. Whatever the reasons, no matter how big mistakes were made, I find it very positive that the political leaders of the countries put forward an approach like ‘I wonder if we can find a solution to the problem’. You have to talk somehow.
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